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Symposium
The Rehnquist Court in Empirical and
Statistical Retrospective

WARREN COURT PRECEDENTS IN THE
REHNQUIST COURT
Frank B. Cross*
Thomas A. Smith**
Antonio Tomarchio***
This research empirically examines the use of particular
Warren Court decisions as precedents in the Rehnquist Court.
Analysis of precedent citation is not widely used but offers insight into judicial decisionmaking and the materiality of the
Court's rulings. Our prior research has shown that the Rehnquist
Court's citation practices appeared to reduce the coherence of
the Supreme Court's network of precedents. 1 In this article we
take a finer grained look at the Court's use of various Warren
Court opinions.
We begin by analyzing the quantitative study of precedent
citation as an analytical measure. Although the tool has some
limitations, there is ample reason to believe that it can provide
important insights into judicial decisions. Our analysis includes a
sample of Warren Court decisions and examines their comparative citation patterns in the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist

Herbert D. Kelleher Centennial Professor of Business Law. McCombs School:
Professor of Law. University of Texas Law School: Professor of Government. University
of Texas at Austin.
** Professor of Law. University of San Diego School of Law.
** * Student of master degree. Politecnico di Milano.
I. See Frank B. Cross et al.. The Reagan Revolution in the Network of Law (June
20011), availahle at http://ssrn.com/abstract=909217 [hereinafter Reagan Revolution]:
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Courts. We then apply a model that allows for the aging of
precedents and find that the Rehnquist Court has significantly
reduced the vitality of, or depreciated the capital of the Warren
Court opinions that we studied. This effect was not a uniform
one, and the magnitude of the depreciation varied according to
which Warren Court Justice authored the opinion to be cited as
precedent.
I. PRECEDENT AS A TOOL OF ANALYSIS

The study of use of precedent offers a valuable tool for analyzing judicial decisionmaking. Traditionally, quantitative empirical analysis of the courts has focused only on the apparent
binary ideological outcome of the decision (liberal or conservative), without respect to the content of the opinion or any other
scale for the decision that could capture its nature. 2 Yet it is the
content of the opinion that is significant, especially for Supreme
Court decisions. The outcome of such a decision affects only the
parties, but the opinion can influence hundreds or thousands of
future cases brought on similar facts. While one might assume
that a liberal outcome would set a liberal precedent, this is not
necessarily the case, and the binary outcome coding cannot
measure whether a particular opinion is moderately liberal (or
conservative) or more extremely ideological. 3 The quantitative
study of precedent can provide some insight into the content of
opinions, as precedents are to some degree the "currency" of the
judicial opinion. "[T]he judiciary's most important policy output
[is] the precedents set by court opinions." 4 However, the meaning of a precedent over time is not constant but is an "iterative
process" in which the Court applies and modifies its meaning. 5

2. But see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis. 19 J .L. & ECON. 249 ( 1976) (examining the rate of citation
over time. which the authors called depreciation of a precedent).
3. See Reagan Revolution. supra note 1. at 7 (noting that "[a] decision might be
liberal in the sense that it ruled for the [more]liberal party to the action but its content
much less liberal than another hypothetical liberal decision in the same case or even than
the presumed state of the existing law at the time of the decision").
4. James F. Spriggs. II & Thomas G. Hansford, Measuring Legal Change: The Reliahility and Validity of Shepard's Citations. 53 POL. RES. Q. 327. 32X (2000).
5. See generally Wayne Mcintosh et al.. Using Information Technology to Examine
the Communication of Precedent: Initial Findings and Lessons from the CITE-IT Project. (Mar. 17-19, 2005) (prepared for the 2005 Annual Meeting of the Western Political
Science Association). availahle al http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt!CITE-IT/Documents/
WPSA %202005.pdf
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The quantitative analysis of precedent has seen only limited
use, though, perhaps because the accumulation of data is quite
time-consuming. 6 Recently, though, data have become available
on the network of citations within the Supreme Court. 7 This data
enables a direct study of precedent citation. Studies using this
network data have begun to emerge. Researchers have used this
network data to identify the most cited cases over the Court's
historl and changes in relative importance of types of cases over
time. 9 We have examined the effect of the Rehnquist Court on
the coherence of the overall network and the determinants of
network cohesion. 10 The remainder of this section discusses the
usefulness of analyzing precedent in judicial decisionmaking.

A. LiMITATIONS OF PRECEDENT AS A TOOL OF ANALYSIS
Before commencing our analysis of the Rehnquist Court's
use of Warren Court precedent, it is important to add some caveats on the reliance on precedent as a tool for measuring judicial decisionmaking. First, precedents are used in very different
ways. An opinion may rely directly upon a precedent and cite it
as governing authority. In this usage, the precedent has great
importance. Alternatively, a decision may cite a precedent only
in passing, such as in a string citation. In this usage, the precedent may carry relatively little weight in determining the decision. Simply counting of precedents does not measure this distinction. Indeed, some realists suggest that precedent simply
serves as a mask for ideological decisionmaking and is irrelevant
to the Court's decisions.
In addition, precedent may be used in a negative manner
that serves to undermine its strength. Most dramatically, the
Court may overrule a precedent and virtually eliminate its authority, though this requires a citation of the overruled opinion.
Even absent an overruling, the Court may significantly under-

6. One seminal study of Supreme Court citation of precedent and overruling is
THOMAS G. HANSFORD & JAMES F. SPRIGGS II, THE POLITICS OF PRECEDE:-JT ON THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT (2006).
7. The use of this network analysis and a description of the network used in this
article is elaborated in Reagan Revolution. supra note 1. at 10-2R.
8. See James H. Fowler et al., Network Analysis and the Law: Measuring the Legal
Importance of Supreme Court Precedents. POL. ANALYSIS. (forthcoming 2007). availahle
at http://jhfowler.ucsd.edu.
9. See James H. Fowler & Sangick Jeon. The Authority of Supreme Court Precedent: A Network Analysis, Soc. NETWORKS (forthcoming 2007). availah/e at
http:/ /jhfowier. ucsd.edu.
I 0. See supra note 1.
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mine the authority of an existing opinion. 11 A more limited negative treatment might involve the distinguishing of a precedent. In
this usage, a Court would explain why a precedent does not govern the facts of the instant case. While such distinguishing may
be perfectly appropriate, because the precedent was inapplicable
to the facts, the approach may also be used to undermine the
precedent, limiting it to its facts and narrowing its future value.
The use of a precedent in a Court decision may also be unavoidable because of its obvious relevance to the case. It is relatively common for the parties for both sides of a case to cite
many of the same precedents in their briefs. This signals that the
parties consider this precedent to be of unavoidable relevance
for the Court. Similarly, one often finds both the majority opinion and dissenting opinions citing the same precedent, which indicates that its ability to govern the Court's decision was somewhat limited. Nevertheless, there remains some "decisional
leeway in determining whether a precedent governs a case." 12
The viability of precedent will also depend on the cases that
come before the Court. An opinion on the dormant commerce
clause, for example, will receive fewer citations before a Court
that chooses to take for review fewer cases in this issue area.
Conversely, if the Court chooses to accept for review more cases
in a particular area of the law, precedents on that area will be
cited more often. This limitation is not so severe, however, because of the Court's docket control. For example, a Court's decision to take certiorari on more Eleventh Amendment cases, for
example, will be meaningful. If the failure to cite a prior precedent is due to denial of certiorari on relevant applications of that
precedent, this decision is also a meaningful one.
Another influence on the Court's use of past precedents will
be the simple number of cases that it accepts for review. A Court
that decides more cases will inevitably cite past precedents more
often. The Rehnquist Court has dramatically reduced the
Court's caseload, at least as compared with other recent Courts.
Consequently, one would expect it to cite fewer precedents in
toto than did those other Courts, unless it dramatically increased
the per-case citations in its opinions. The outcome of this effect

II. See HANSFORD & SPRIGGS. s11pra note n. at n (observing that "the Court can
negatively interpret a precedent by restricting its reach or calling into question its continuing importance" and thus undercut its legal authority and "diminish its applicability
to other legal disputes").
12. /rl. at 22.
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will be addressed below, as it explains the use of Warren Court
precedents in the Rehnquist Court.
B. SURVIVING VIRTUES OF PRECEDENT AS A TOOL OF
ANALYSIS

Notwithstanding the limitations addressed above, the analysis of precedent retains utility in the analysis of judicial decisionmaking. If precedents were not meaningful, the Court would
not ever take the trouble to overturn them. Moreover, the relative importance of such precedents is obvious from the heavy reliance they receive in briefs presented to the Court.
The greatest importance of a Supreme Court precedent lies
in the governance it provides for the future decisions of the
Court itself and of lower courts. 13 Because lower courts decide
many more cases than does the Supreme Court, the significance
of a Court's opinion lies primarily in its progeny-the degree to
which it is applied in later cases by lower courts. Ample research
indicates that lower courts are relatively reliable interpreters of
Supreme Court precedents. 14
Richard Posner has argued for greater use of such empirical
quantitative studies of citations to precedent. 15 He notes that
"[j]udges, lawyers who brief and argue cases, and law professors
and students ... [may] make their living" through the analysis
and use of such precedents. 16 He argues that "rigorous quantitative analysis" enables the study of "elusive but important social
phenomena such as reputation, influence, prestige, celebrity, the
diffusion of knowledge, the rise and decline of schools of
thought, stare decisis," and other factors. 17
Recent empirical analysis illustrates the relevance of the
"vitality" of particular precedents as reflected by their citation

13. See id. at 3 (noting that the ''legal reasoning" of an opinion "can have more farreaching consequences·· than the simple case outcome "by altering the existing state of
legal policy and thus helping to structure the outcomes of future disputes").
14. See. e.g. Sara C. Benesh & Malia Reddick. Overruled. An Event History Analysis of Lower Court Reaction to Supreme Court Alteration of Precedent, 64 J. POL. 534
(2002): Charles A. Johnson. Law, Politics, and Judicial Decision Making: Lower Federal
Court Uses of Supreme Court Decisions, 21 L. & SOC. REV. 325 (19H7): Donald R. Songer
et al.. The Hierarchy of Justice: Te.\'/ing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme CourtCirwit Court Interactions, 3H AM. J. POL. SCI. 673 (1994).
15. See generally Richard A. Posner. An Economic Analysis of the Use of Citations
in the Law. 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 3H1 (2000).
16. /d. at 3H2.
17. /d.
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patterns. Not all precedents "have the same bite." 18 There is
some dispute over the determinants of precedential vitality, with
some suggestion that a larger Court majority might strengthen
the authority of an opinion. 19 Hansford and Spriggs examined
the question of precedential influence and hypothesized that a
precedent's vitality was largely the product of being cited. 20 They
found a significant association between the precedent's vitality
(as measured by Qrior citations to the precedent) and its future
use by the Court. 21 Perhaps more significantly, they also found
that a positive citation to a prior precedent, giving it vitality, si~
nificantly increased its future use by lower federal courts. 2
There is ample evidence of the effect of Supreme Court Justices
ideology on its decisions, 23 and the authors found that this effect
extended to citations-coalitions of more liberal Justices were
more likely to increase the vitality of precedents decided by
more liberal coalitions of Justices.
Thus, Supreme Court precedents and their citation have
material practical importance. When the Court cites a prior
opinion as precedent, it gives that opinion greater vitality in the
law. Greater vitality, in turn, yields greater significance for the
opinion for future decisions. Precedential citation choice, therefore, has meaning and is worthy of empirical analysis.
II. WARREN COURT PRECEDENTS IN
THE REHNQUIST COURT
One might expect the relatively conservative Rehnquist
Court to make limited use of the relatively liberal Warren Court
precedents. To test this hypothesis, we used the Supreme Court
network of precedents and examined a random sample of seventy-seven decisions rendered by the Warren Court and their citation rates in the subsequent years of the Warren Court, the
Burger Court, and the Rehnquist Court. This enables a comparison of the degree to which Warren Court cases were cited overall and among opinions of that Court.

18. Ruggero J. Aldisert. Precedent: What It Is and What It lsn 't: When Do We Kiss It
ancl When Do We Kill ft'l, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 605.631 (1990).
19. /d. at 632.
20. See HANSFORD & SPRIGGS. Sllpra note o. at 32-33.
21. /d.at100tbl.6.1.
22. /dat117-19.
23. See ~:enerally, e.g. HANSFORD & SPRIGGS. s11pra note o.
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The average Rehnquist Court majority opinion citation rate
for the Warren Court cases in our sample was 0.60 per year. This
rate ranged from nearly three citations per year for the famous
opinion in Miranda v. Arizona 24 to zero citations for Toalson v.
New York Yankees, Inc. 25 The extremes of citation illustrate the
limits of Supreme Court choice in citation selection. The conservative Rehnquist Court presumably did not want to vitalize the
Miranda decision but accepted cases in which the doctrine could
not be avoided. However, the Court used these opportunities to
hedge the implications of the decision.
Indeed, Miranda provides a useful illustration of the Court's
use of precedent. Contrary to some expectations, the Rehnquist
Court rejected the opportunit~ to essentially overrule Miranda
out of respect for stare decisis. 6 Nevertheless, the Court used its
opinions, and citations to Miranda, to chip away at the decision's
significance. The Burger Court initially retained Miranda's basic
"expansive approach," 27 but began its retrenchment. This accelerated in the Rehnquist Court, which was "hostile to Miranda's
exclusion of reliable evidence. " 28 The decision was said to be "silently buried" by the Rehnquist Court. 29 Thus, the high level of
citations to Miranda in the Rehnquist Court recognized the importance of precedent but simultaneously undermined the power
of that precedent.
While Miranda was the most cited of the Warren Court
cases in our sample, at nearly three citations per year, that rate is
not truly so high. In the Warren Court, the decision received
more than ten citations per year after its issuance, and in the
Burger Court, Miranda received an average of more than seven
citations per year. Arguably, the Rehnquist Court devitalized
Miranda, relative to an expected baseline of annualized citations.
Thus, it appears that the Rehnquist Court gave Miranda fewer
citations overall and may have used those fewer citations to limit
its authority.
The reduction in citation is similar for other prominent
cases contained in our sample. For New York Times Co. v. Sulli-

24.
25.
26.
27.

3X4 U.S. 436 (1%6).
346 u.s. 356 (1953).
See Dickerson v. United States. 530 U.S. 42H, 443-44 (2000).
Stephanos Bibas. The Rehnquist Court's Fijih Amendment Incrementalism. 74
GEO.WASH. L. REV. 107H. 10H1 (2006).
28. !d. at 1UH4.
29. Laurence A. Benner. Requiem for Miranda: The Rehnquist Court's Vo!untariness Doctrine in Hislorical Perspective.67 WASH. U. L.Q. 5\J, 163 (1 \JH\J).
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30

van, the Warren and Burger Courts gave the opinion five or
more citations per year, which declined to an average of fewer
than 1.5 annual citations during the Rehnquist Court. The important right to counsel ruling of Gideon v. Wainwright 31 received over eight citations per year in the Warren Court, and
over five citations per year in the Burger Court, but fewer than
two citations per year by the Rehnquist Court.
The raw data suggest a considerable depreciation of vitality
for Warren Court precedents, including some very important decisions, in the Rehnquist Court. Moreover, the Miranda experience suggests that even those fewer citations may have been devoted to undermining the power of the precedent. Analysis of
the fate of Warren Court precedents in the Rehnquist Court requires a somewhat more detailed analysis to compare the number of citations with what might be expected for given cases and
to try to explain any differences discovered. The following section undertakes this analysis.

III. AGING OF WARREN COURT PRECEDENTS IN
THE REHNQUIST COURT
The above section simply presents data on the frequency
with which the Rehnquist Court cited certain opinions of the
Warren Court. While this provides some information, one would
want an "expected value" of such citations before drawing conclusions. We noted the possibility that Warren opinions received
more citations because they were such important cases, and it is
possible that the Marshall opinions received fewer citations because they happened to be in relatively unimportant cases. Some
benchmark expected value is necessary to control for the unavoidability feature of citing precedents. Creating such an expected value of citation, though, requires some benchmark for
the expectation, and there is no indisputable objective measure
for a particular opinion's citation frequency. We use Burger
Court citations to the Warren Court cases as our benchmark,
which at least provides a comparison of the Rehnquist and Burger Court eras.
Before proceeding with this analysis, we need some understanding of the effect of age on a precedent's vitality. In other
citations networks, such as the World Wide Web, the temporal

30.
31.

376
372

u.s. 254 (1964).
u.s. 335 (1963).
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factor has no impact in determining the attractivenness of a
document in getting new citations. In our network analysis of the
United States Supreme Court, we discovered that time is important because cases tend to age. "Aging" means that a document
progressively looses its ability to attract new citations as its age
increases. Younger cases tend to be more attractive than very
old cases. The dynamics of growth of the network is thus led by
this aging phenomenon. We studied the probability that a legal
case will get a new citation and we averaged over all cases. This
average probability is called the "kernel" of the network in network theory language. It provides information on the growth
mechanism of the network. In most real networks, we find a
"preferential attachment" mechanism of growth. This means
that the probability that a document will get a new citation increases with the degree of the document. We found that in the
United States Supreme Court network, we still have a preferential attachment mechanism, but we also found that the age of the
case has an important influence.
In particular, the increase of the degree of a legal case, 11k,
is related with a power law function of the age according to the
following formula:
L1k =a·"
where k is the citation to a precedent, a is the age of the precedent, and B is an exponent which depends on the degree of the
document and which undergoes strong variations in different historical periods. This provides us with an "age-kernel" formula
for separating the effect of a precedent's age on its future citations. This reflects, one could say, the depreciation of the capital
stock of precedent over time. 32
It is important to note that B is not always negative. It takes
a certain amount of time for precedents to come into their vitality, and they typically grow in significance over a certain number
of years. Cases of great age tend on average to have lost their influence. However, this effect does not occur promptly, and the
aging/vitality association has varied over time. Figure 1 displays
the distribution of rate of citation (degree) for the year 2000,
with the relative age of the precedent on the horizontal axis and
the cumulative citations it has received on the vertical axis.

32.

See generally Landes & Posner. supra note 2.
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Figure 1
Aging of Precedent in 2000
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The fit line for this figure reveals that cumulative citations steadily increased for past precedents up to around fifty years of age.
At about that time, the citation rate begins to level off to a point
where much older cases are seldom cited, on average.
Different courts have relied to greater or lesser degrees on
older precedents. The relative effect of aging in years from recent decades can be seen in the following summary table, which
displays the change in B over time.
Table 1
Relative Aging of Precedents Over Time
Year
1950
1960
1980
2000

B

-0.73776
-0.70922
-0.80599
-0.43904

In 2000, during the Rehnquist Court, aging had relatively less effect on the probability of a case citation, as the negative magnitude of B was much smaller than in recent prior Courts. The
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Rehnquist Court thus tended to rely more on elderly precedents
than did the Courts for the earlier comparison decades.
To ascertain the effect of the Rehnquist Court on the citation of Warren Court precedents, we calculated the citation profile for each of the cases in our sample. For our benchmark, we
examined the citation profile for those same cases during the
Burger Court era. Initially, we compared the probability of a
Rehnquist Court citation to a particular Warren Court precedent
with the probability of a Burger Court citation to that precedent
and found a high correlation of approximately 0.90. This provides some evidence of the effect of the legal model of decisionmaking or the unavoidability of citation to a precedent. The citation of particular precedents in the two Courts was roughly
parallel, probably a testimony to their indisputed relevance to
the cases before the Courts. However, the ten percent variance
reveals some change in citation patterns that may be of pragmatic import. In addition, there was only a 0.43 correlation between the Warren Court's use of its own precedents and the
Rehnquist Court's use of those precedents.
This correlation only examines the citations among Warren
Court precedents, though, and cannot reveal the relative significance given to those precedents by the Rehnquist Court. Thus, it
is possible that the Rehnquist Court reduced the vitality of all
Warren Court precedents, without altering the relative vitality of
particular opinions rendered by that Court. To examine the latter effect, we compared the citation of each of our sample Warren Court precedents in the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. This
revealed an average seventy percent reduction in citations to
Warren Court precedents as compared to their citations in the
Burger Court. Indeed, the Rehnquist Court citations for the
cases in our sample were below the comparative expected value
for seventy-six of the cases and increased for only one. 33 This
demonstrates that the Rehnquist Court significantly decreased
the vitality of the Warren Court opinions that we studied.
Some of this effect is certainly attributable to the smaller
docket of the Rehnquist Court. 34 While the Burger Court aver33. The exceptional case for which Rehnquist Court citations increased was Hanna
v. Plumer. 3HO U.S. 460 ( 1'!65). The case was important procedurally in establishing that
the use of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure survived Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.
304 U.S. 64 (!93H). and that the Rules. as opposed to conflicting state rules. govern.
34. One of the most striking features of the Rehnquist Court was its reduction in
the Court's docket. as compared to the Burger Court. See Frank B. Cross & Stefanic
Lindquist. The Decisional Significance of 1he Chief .fu.wice. !54 U. PA. L. REV. I 665.
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aged about 135 majority opinions per term, the Rehnquist court
dropped this average to around ninety per term. Assuming no
change in the number of citations per case, one would expect the
probability of any given case's citation to drop by about thirtythree percent, due simply to the decreased caseload. So the reduced caseload could explain about half of the reduction in vitality of Warren Court decisions.
The decrease in precedent vitality was not uniform among
the Warren Court opinions examined. The data showed a slight
increase in vitality for Hanna and Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 35 and the most dramatic decrease in vitality for Benton v. Maryland. 36 The depreciation of precedent thus
varied considerably for different opinions.
The results for our sample were integrated into the United
States Supreme Court Database, to permit further analysis of citation rates. The difference among cases could be explained by a
tendency of the Rehnquist Court to more frequently cite conservative decisions than liberal ones, but this was not the case.
There was no difference in citation probability based on the direction of the case outcome. This could be due to a variety of
reasons including: (a) sincere, nonideological citation, (b) negative citations to liberal opinions, or (c) the possibility that the direction of the outcome is not a reliable indicator of the degree to
which the opinion was liberal or conservative.
Another possible determinant of case citation is the size of
the majority vote in the precedential case. Perhaps larger majorities carry greater future weight. The Court's occasional desire
for unanimity in controversial cases suggests that this might be
so. 37 This theory has been undermined by prior empirical analysis,38 though, and was untrue for our cases. There was no difference in citation probability based on the size of the majority vote
in the case.
Our comparative examination of depreciation focuses on
the authors of the opinions in our sample. The Rehnquist Court

1oYo (200o) (displaying the reduction in Figure 7).

35. 373 U.S. 132 (1%3). This decision held that a state law regulating agriculture
did not offend the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.
36. 31}5 U.S. 7K4 (1Y6Y). This decision found that the double jeopardy bar prevented
a conviction on a larceny charge after a burglary conviction was set aside.
37. See Frank B. Cross. The Justices of Strategy. 4H DUKE L.J. 511. 554-57 (1YYH)
(discussing some of the theory and evidence of this effect).
38. See generally HANSFORD & SPRIGGS. supra note o.
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may have cited opinions by certain Warren Court Justices more
than others, for a variety of possible reasons. Our hypothesis is
that the Rehnquist Court will be more likely cite cases written by
Justices with whom the Court has greater ideological affinity,
e.g., the relatively more conservative Warren Court Justices. To
test this theory, we took the mean depreciation rate for opinions
authored by various Justices of the Warren Court. Figure 2 displays the results.
Figure 2
Precedent Depreciation by Warren Court Justice-Author

Black
Brennan
Clark
Court
Douglas
Fortas
Harlan
Marshall
Stewart
Warren
White

0

.2

.4

.6

.8

mean of Depreciation

There is some differential effect in relative depreciation by
Justice of the Warren Court. Justice Marshall's opinions suffered
the greatest depreciation, at a rate over twenty-five percent higher
than that of Justices Harlan and Clark. Relatively high depreciation rates were also found for Justices Fortas, Douglas, White, and
Brennan, as well as for unauthored opinions of the full Warren
Court. Although our sample size was small, the differences in depreciation reached statistical significance for opinions written by
Warren (less depreciation) and Marshall (more depreciation) and
were nearly significant for Fortas and Brennan (more depreciation). The meaning of the difference is not entirely clear-perhaps
some Justices wrote narrower opinions of lesser future value, de-
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cided less significant cases, or simply wrote poorer, less persuasive
opinions. The general association with ideology, though, suggests
that the ideological content of the opinions may have influenced
their citation rate in the Rehnquist Court.
The relatively anomalous finding of Figure 2 is the relatively
low depreciation of decisions authored by Chief Justice Warren,
who is generally regarded as more liberal than some other Justices
of the Court, such as Justice Harlan. These Warren opinions were
presumably very important decisions and hence unavoidable citations, but that effect should be controlled by the comparison with
Burger Court citations. This finding may indicate that the actual
language of the opinions written by Warren was not so liberal as
commonly perceived. Alternatively, these decisions may have
been particular targets of negative citations by the Rehnquist
Court, as illustrated by its limitation of the Warren-authored
Miranda opinion. Subsequent research with additional data is
necessary to disaggregate the meaning of this finding. Regardless
of the reason, it is important to note that Warren opinions were
also depreciated by the Rehnquist Court, albeit at a lesser rate
than those of other Justices.
Some preliminary conclusions may be drawn. First, the
Rehnquist Court depreciated the capital stock of Warren Court
decisions. While about half of this might be attributed to its reduced caseload, the remaining half must be explained by some
more case-specific choice, whether in opinion writing or case selection. Second, this depreciation varied by opinion author, and it
appears that the Rehnquist Court had greater disfavor for precedents written by particular Justices of the Warren Court.
CONCLUSION
Empirical analysis of the legal content of opinions, such as citation of precedents, is the next important frontier for quantitative
empirical legal research. Such research has only just begun, with
analyses such as The Politics of Precedent and other research cited
above. 39 We offer an advance in these analyses in the Rehnquist
Court's treatment of prior precedents and hope to stimulate further research in the area.
Our most important findings are on the overall depreciation
of the overall Warren Court precedents in the Rehnquist Court,

39.

See supra notes JS-23. 27-29. and accompanying text.
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which are consistent with our earlier findings on the effect of the
Rehnquist Court on the network of Supreme Court precedents.
This is explained in part, but not entirely, by the Rehnquist
Court's smaller docket. Earlier research demonstrates the significance of a precedent's vitality on future decisions, so that the
Rehnquist Court apparently depreciated the importance of these
decisions. The discovery of an association between citations and
opinion authors is an intriguing one but not yet conclusive and
would benefit from replication with a different set of Warren
Court opinions. In addition, much additional research remains
on these issues, such as the relative negative treatment of various
precedents.

